

The PRESIDENT. According to parliamentary law, a member of the body cannot re-agitate a question that has once been decided, unless he voted in the affirmative. If a member can move to annul a proposition which he voted against, he can do indirectly what the rules of the house do not allow him to do directly.

Mr. BELT appealed from the decision of the Chair; and upon that appeal, demanded the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question being taken, the result was—yeas 40, nays 13—as follows:

Yeas—Messrs. Abbott, Annan, Audoun, Barron, Brooks, Carter, Cunningham, Cushing, Daniel, Davis, of Washington, Earle, Ecker, Galloway, Harwood, Hatch, Hoffman, Hopkins, Hopper, Keefer, King, Larsh, Markey, McComas, Mullikin, Murray, Nyman, Parker, Pugh, Russell, Sands, Schley, Smith, of Dorchester, Sneary, Stirling, Stockbridge, Swope, Sykes, Thomas, Wickard, Wood—40.

Nays—Messrs. Beit, Chambers, Crawford, Davis, of Charles, Dent, Henkle, Hollyday, Johnson, Jones, of Somerset, Lee, Mitchell, Miller, Morgan—13.

As their names were called, the following members explained their votes:

Mr. DAVIS, of Charles, said: It is very unpleasant to vote against the decision of the Chair, but having a strong conviction that it is competent for the convention at any time to rescind an order, I vote “no.”

Mr. HARWOOD said: In the amendment of our rules the motion was made to amend, which lay over one day under the rules, and was acted upon without a motion to reconsider. I thought that was not in order, and I think this is not in order, and I vote “aye.”

Mr. HENKLE said: The forty-second rule referred to by my friend, was adopted by the convention. It required a majority of the members elected to the convention to adopt any section or article. Subsequently the gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr. Cushing) did not move a reconsideration, but gave notice that he would offer an amendment which embodied the very same principle and the very same subject-matter, and it was adopted by the convention. I then took the ground that after the subject had been once decided, the same subject-matter could not be re-agitated and brought before the convention except upon a motion to reconsider. The issue I then took was not sustained by the Chair, and in order to conform to the decision then, I vote “no.”

Mr. JONES, of Somerset, said: My vote will be governed by my construction of the resolution of the gentleman from Prince George's (Mr. Belt.) I look upon his resolution as a proposition to repeal the order that was adopted yesterday. I consider “rescind” as being equivalent to “repeal,” and there-

fore, with great deference to the Chair, vote “no.”

Mr. MILLER said: Like the gentlemen from Somerset (Mr. Jones,) I look upon this resolution as repealing an order already passed by this body. My view of parliamentary law is that it is perfectly competent for a legislative body which has passed a law, or act, or a resolution, to repeal that law, or act, or resolution, without going through the form of reconsidering the vote by which it was adopted. I therefore vote “no.”

Mr. SANDS. The construction placed upon the resolution offered by my friend from Prince George's (Mr. Belt,) operating as a repeal, would entirely nullify the rule that a proposition once decided could not be disturbed except by reconsideration on the motion of a member who voted in the majority. I therefore vote to sustain the Chair—“aye.”

So the decision of the Chair was sustained.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

The forty-first section was read as follows:

“Sec. 41. No person shall be imprisoned for debt.”

Mr. HENKLE. I move to insert the word “white” before the word “person.” The principle of imprisonment for debt has been considered as a debatable one. It now exists in the constitutions of some of the States of the Union with regard to white citizens, and it did exist in our own constitution up to the time of the adoption of the present constitution. The propriety of imprisonment for debt is then a mooted question. Although I am no advocate of it for the white race, or under any circumstances unless urgent and sufficient, yet I think several reasons may be urged for the propriety of leaving it to the discretion of the Legislature to decide whether there shall be imprisonment for debt for the negro under any circumstances.

As a general rule the negroes have very little property, and are very prone to involve themselves by obtaining credit wherever they can. In a majority of cases there is no property by which the payment of a debt can be secured, and it is lost. Then you have the exemption law, which exempts a certain amount of property of a debtor from seizure and sale under the law. The attachment law of the State of Maryland, as it now exists, is such that any man having no property and not having an honest heart, may evade the payment of his debts. You cannot attach the wages due a man unless there are more than ten dollars coming to him. It is very easy for a man who is dishonestly disposed, continually to draw upon his wages, so that there shall never at any time be so much as ten dollars due him. Consequently the attachment law will have no force or effect whatever.

Now, I think the colored race are not so